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Sensitivity of Commercial & Industrial Loans to Regional Economic & Banking
Conditions: An Analysis Across the Midwest
Abstract
Commercial banking is a substantial industry with over 5,000 commercial banks in the United States. An
important feature of a bank’s activity is lending for different purposes. Different types of loans distributed
by banks are crucial to propel an economy forward. My research focuses on the commercial banking
industry in the Midwest region of the United States. Specifically, I will examine Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN),
Iowa (IA), Kansas (KS), Kentucky (KY), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), Missouri (MS), Ohio (OH), and
Wisconsin (WI). In 2013, these 10 states together housed 2,446 of the 5,865 banks in the nation, which is
42% of the nation’s total banks. Specifically, this paper will analyze how regional economic indicators and
bank-specific indicators impact commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. Analyzing C&I loans is relevant
because understanding the underlying factors that affect C&I lending is important from a bank’s risk
management perspective.
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Sensitivity of Commercial & Industrial Loans to Regional
Economic & Banking Conditions: An Analysis
Across the Midwest
Natalie Witter
I. Introduction
Commercial banking is a substantial industry
with over 5,000 commercial banks in the United States.
An important feature of a bank’s activity is lending for
different purposes. Different types of loans distributed
by banks are crucial to propel an economy forward. My
research focuses on the commercial banking industry in
the Midwest region of the United States. Specifically, I
will examine Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA),
Kansas (KS), Kentucky (KY), Michigan (MI),
Minnesota (MN), Missouri (MS), Ohio (OH), and
Wisconsin (WI). In 2013, these 10 states together
housed 2,446 of the 5,865 banks in the nation, which is
42% of the nation’s total banks. Specifically, this paper
will analyze how regional economic indicators and
bank-specific indicators impact commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans. Analyzing C&I loans is relevant
because understanding the underlying factors that affect
C&I lending is important from a bank’s risk
management perspective.
Generally, banks’ assets include relatively safe,
liquid assets such as government securities. However,
banks also have illiquid assets, such as loans. Banks
make various types of loans: C&I, real estate,
agricultural, and individual. These less liquid assets earn
more income but are inherently more risky. Within the
different categories of loans, C&I loans are among the
riskier types of loans.
Examining C&I loans and their relationship
with local economic indicators is important because

business cycles impact the banking sector, and
hence, bank lending. An example of this is the most
recent financial crisis in the United States. Koepke
(2011) notes that the shocks the banking sector saw

in the financial crisis were “historically unprecedented”
(p. 168). Given that the banking sector had not been
exposed to this magnitude of a recession before, it is
critical to examine the causes of this recession and
potential ways the banking sector can recover.
Currently, the banking sector is in the process
of recovering from the recent financial crisis. The
recovery is evidenced by a report noting competition for
C&I loans is “fierce” (Stewart, 2014). This is positive
news for the overall economy. Increased competition
can have two implications. The first is that there is an
increase in the number of loans being made. The second
is competition may be fierce because banks are lending
less in an attempt to recover funds lost during a
financial crisis.
Previewing the results of my research, I find
that real state GDP growth, real personal income
growth, bank return on assets (ROA), credit quality of a
bank’s assets, and the capital-to-assets ratio have an
impact on real C&I loans. All significant variables have
a positive relationship with real C&I loans except for
the capital-to-assets ratio, which negatively affected
C&I loans.
This paper continues with a literature review in
section II. Then, the theory is discussed in section III,
followed by the data in section IV, and the hypothesis in
section V. Next, section VI introduces the empirical
model, and section VII discusses the results. Lastly, the
paper is concluded in section VIII with consideration of
policy implications from this research and avenues for
future research.

II. Literature Review
There are currently multiple arenas of the
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banking sector that are heavily studied. I focus on
reviewing ideas central to commercial bank lending.
Much of the literature discusses the cyclical component of bank lending. There are views and literature
that support both sides of cyclicality—that lending
can be procyclical as well as counter-cyclical. Dages
(2000) explains the reasoning for both sides of the
argument. He claims that transaction based lending, a lending practice in which banks focus on
the hard facts of a loan and not the borrower, drive
lending patterns to be procyclical. This is because
better economic conditions provide opportunities
for expanding one’s business, and more loans are
both demanded and supplied (p. 20). Along with an
expansion driving businesses to demand loans, when
the economy is expanding, the numbers always look
better and loans seem less risky to banks. This is why
transaction lending encourages procyclical behavior.
The second type of lending Dages (2000) notes is
relationship lending. Dages (2000) states that lending levels are counter-cyclical when banks focus on
relationship lending. Relationship lending is when
banks focus on the individual relationships they have
and make lending decisions based more heavily on
the previous lending encounters they have had with
said borrower. In this case, Dages (2000) points out
that banks use lending to help established customers, “smooth over the effects of cyclical fluctuations
or consumption” (p. 20). Therefore, when the business cycle is contracting, lending increases to offset
the negative economic condition being experienced
by businesses. On the other hand, during expansions, borrowers pay back the loans taken during the
downturn rather than taking on more loans. Because
the number of loans made during expansions shrinks,
lending is counter-cyclical. While the author provides
explanations for both, the majority of the literature
does not support Dages’ counter-cyclical relationship lending theory. Rather, it focuses on lending as a
procyclical variable.
When describing why lending is procyclical, literature offers a few different explanations. The
first and most prevalent comes from Athanasoglou
(2014), and relates to the efficient market hypothesis.
The efficient market hypothesis states that borrowers
and lenders are all privy to the same information in
markets, and all individuals make rational investment
decisions based on that information. Therefore, banks

make loans having a full set of information. The same
goes for borrowers—when they take out a loan, they
have a full set of information. The efficient market
hypothesis suggests, then, that both lenders and
borrowers have the same information sets and
make/borrow loans trusting and knowing the same
present and future economic conditions.
The ideas presented thus far allude to the notion
that banks play a role in driving the business cycle.
Athanasoglou (2014) says the main reason for procyclicality in variables related to the banking sector is
deviations from the efficient market hypothesis. Later
in his article, Athanasoglou (2014) also gives attention to the efficiency of banks in the market. He built
upon the idea of banks driving the business cycle by
writing that, “during the upward phase of the cycle,
. . . loans are granted to investments with marginally
positive or even a negative net present value” (p. 64).
By making loans that banks would not have normally
made, or certainly would not have made during a
contraction, they are encouraging the expansion
of the business cycle. On the contrary, when banks
conservatize their lending agenda during recessions,
it emphasizes the economic slowdown, which accentuates the negative impacts of a contraction.
In credit markets, rather than having equal
information sets, borrowers and lenders are subject
to asymmetric information. As noted above, Athanasoglou (2014) claims asymmetric information is
the strongest cause of procyclicality (p. 61). Further,
he noted borrowers have the upper hand in regard to
knowledge about a loan (Athanasoglou 2014). This is
because borrowers are able to withhold information/
their concerns from a bank when applying for a loan.
And, when banks practice transactional lending they
support procyclicality. So, banks are mostly focused
on the numbers of the loan rather than the personal
details. Overall, asymmetric information in favor of
the borrower leads to banks making more loans when
the numbers appear better in an expansion, and fewer
loans in a contraction. These tendencies are what
drive the procyclical nature of bank lending.
Along with positive economic conditions
influencing banks to lend more, Athanasoglou (2014)
suggests that a bank’s competition also has an influence on their lending decisions. While I am not accounting for fellow bank competition in my project,
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I am noting it here as it is discussed in the literature.
Bank competition pairs with positive economic conditions and urges banks to lend more in good economic times. For example, if a bank were considering
tapering their lending because they were lending too
aggressively, the actions of their competition would
most likely make that decision for them. Athanasoglou (2014) writes, “bank managers and large institutional investors tend to follow their competitors,
therefore adding to the market volatility” (p. 61). So,
the more each bank increases (decreases) lending in
an expansion (contraction), the more those decisions
dissipate throughout the local banking sector, and the
more pronounced the business cycle becomes.
A separate idea presented in the literature is
that single-market banks react differently to regional
economic changes than multi-market banks do. Prior
to the financial crisis, single-market banks were very
common. However, since 2007, over 500 banks have
failed. This means that over 500 banks have closed or
were bought out by a larger bank. The buying of small
banks by larger banks has led to the presence of
more multi-market banks than there were prior to the
financial crisis. The increase in multi-market banks
has created new trends for the banking sector and its
reactions to regional economic shocks.
Keeton (2009) explains that studying how
multi-market banks react to changes in regional
economic indicators is relevant, because for local
communities, a change in bank performance, “affects
the volatility of [the community’s output and employment]” (p. 5). But, the effects of bank performance do
not stop there. Not only does bank performance have
local impacts, but also Keeton (2009) notes that the,
“distribution of credit across markets can affect overall productivity and growth” (p. 5). Therefore, a shift
to multi-market banking has impacts on a greater
number of geographical locations due to banks being
integrated in multiple markets.
In regard to the sensitivity of multi-market
banks compared to single-market banks, Keeton
(2009) finds multi-market banks are not as sensitive to changes in local economic indicators. Being
involved in multiple markets does not allow banks to
be as in tune with local economic conditions. When
a bank is only involved in one market, they are, for

104

the most part, only greatly impacted by changes in
supply and demand in that area. However, multimarket banks are impacted by changes in economic
conditions in multiple areas. Therefore, they may not
be fully aware of each market they are in and how it
is doing economically. In general, it is expected that
multi-market banks will be less sensitive to changes
in the business cycle compared to single-market
banks.
Multi-market banking brings new characteristics to the supply of loanable funds. In a singlemarket bank, if loan performance decreases, lending
levels also decrease. However, if loan performance
decreases for a multi-market bank, the bank may
not have to immediately decrease lending levels to
account for poor loan performance. Rather, multimarket banks may be able to pull funds from another
market they are in that is faring well and supplement
the need in the bank with poor loan performance.
Being able to do this allows the supply of loanable
funds for multi-market banks to be less responsive, or
more inelastic, to local economic shocks compared to
single-market banks (Keeton 2009). A similar reaction is seen with demand side shocks.
Prior to multi-market banking, if the demand for
loans decreased, single-market banks had to either
adjust their interest rate to spur lending or hold tight
until demand increased. However, if a multi-market
bank experiences a decrease in demand in one of
their markets, there is not as comprehensive of an
effect on the bank as a whole. Because multi-market
banks are diversified in location, one market performing poorly can be outweighed or neutralized
by another market performing well (Keeton 2009).
Overall, multi-market banking causes banks to be less
reactive to localized economic shocks.
Berrospide and Keeton (2013) discuss these
new trends and build upon Keeton’s previous work.
They assign the new trends the substitution effect
and the spillover effect. In a culminating statement,
Berrospide (2013) notes, “multi-market banks should
reduce local lending less than single-market banks in
response to adverse local loan supply shocks” (p. 2).
While Keeton’s earlier work agrees with this statement, Berrospide (2013) concludes with a different
idea for demand shocks. Berrospide (2013) claims that
in a contraction, “multi-market banks should
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reduce local lending more than single-market banks”
(p. 2). He grounds these assertions in the spillover
and substitution effects. The spillover effect captures
supply side changes. These are changes in lending
a bank makes in region B due to adverse economic
conditions in region A. The spillover effect says that
if region A is experiencing negative economic conditions, banks will reduce lending in that region and
increase lending in region B, given region B is not
experiencing adverse economic conditions. Next,
the substitution effect says that if there is a negative
demand shock in one region, banks will substitute
lending in other sectors and pull out of the poorly
performing sector. These ideas are examples of new
trends being seen with the increase in multi-market
banking. While I am not controlling for multi-market
versus single-market in my research, it is an area that
future research may want to delve into as multi-market banks are becoming more and more prevalent.

III. Theory
The theory being used for this research is
the loanable funds theory (Abel 2011). The loanable
funds theory states that the amount of loans supplied
and the funds saved by households to fund those
loans find an equilibrium quantity and interest rate in
the market for loanable funds. Firms requiring funds
for capital expenditure and/or research and development (R&D) are the demanders for loanable funds. In
this research, the demand will represent the demand
for C&I loans. I expect the demand for C&I loans
to move in a procyclical fashion. The healthier the
economy, the more businesses invest in expanding,
R&D, etc.
The supply of loanable funds comes from
households that put their funds into a savings account at a bank. In other words, the supply is the
dollar amount of deposits in the bank that banks can
loan. Banks then use the funds being saved by households to make loans to firms that want to borrow. In
this research, the supply curve represents the aggregate dollar amount supplied in C&I loans. Figure 1
shows the graphical framework for the loanable funds
theory.
The supply line is labeled S and the demand

curve is labeled D. The value on the x-axis represents
the quantity of funds loaned, and the y-axis shows the
interest rate that quantity of loans is loaned at. The
supply and demand interact in the market to reach an
interest rate where the quantity demanded equals the
quantity supplied. I expect the supply of C&I loans
to move in a procyclical manner. During economic
expansions, households have more funds to put aside
and save, so the level of deposits in the bank increases. The increase in available funds and the increase in
demand for C&I loans causes the amount of dollars
supplied in C&I loans to increase as well.
These assumptions are supported by Keeton’s
(2009) research. In regard to the procyclicality of the
demand for C&I loans, he asserts that during contractions, business activity decreases (p. 15). Because
of the decrease in revenue and income, businesses
will not be in a financial situation to demand C&I
loans. In regard to supply, Keeton (2009) concludes
economic contractions are associated with lower employment levels and income (p. 16). This supports the
assumption that deposit levels will decrease during
contractions. Lower employment and income levels
mean individuals do not store as much money in a
savings account, so deposits decrease. The decrease in
deposits decreases the supply of loanable funds.
IV. Hypothesis
My research focuses on the impacts that regional economic indicators and bank-specific variables have on C&I loans. Overall, I hypothesize that
C&I loans made by commercial banks are procyclical
and sensitive to changes in state GDP and personal
income growth rates, state HPI, state unemployment
rates, the real loan rate, bank ROA, credit quality,
and capital-to-asset ratio. An economic expansion
will result in an increase in C&I loans. Further, an
increase in the overall health of the bank or economy,
or a decrease in a bank’s capitalization will also result
in an increase in C&I loans.
V. Data Description
5.1. Variables Description and Preliminary Diagnostics
This research analyzes the effects of both regional economic indicators and bank specific indicators on the level of C&I lending in the 10 Midwestern
states of Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas,
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Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The dependent variable in this study is Commercial & Industrial (C&I) loans. These loans are a type
of loans banks make, and they are the riskiest. As noted in the Literature Review, C&I loans have a cyclical component to them. Further, they are influenced
by the business cycle and condition of the banking
sector. Because this research is analyzing how both
regional economic indicators and overall bank health
impact C&I loans, there are multiple economic and
banking variables used.
The regional economic indicators included
in this study are state GDP growth, personal income
growth, state HPI, and state unemployment rate. State
GDP growth and personal income growth are used as
proxies for local business cycles. State GDP growth
measures the yearly increase or decrease in state
GDP. Personal income growth measures the yearly
growth in household incomes in each state. The HPI
is a measure of housing prices in each state, and state
unemployment rates capture the unemployed population as a share of the labor force in each state. Along
with regional variables, state-level, bank-specific variables are also used in this research and are addressed
next.
The bank-specific variables in this study are
bank return on assets (ROA), credit quality, and capital-to-asset ratio. A bank’s ROA is a measure of bank
profitability. It measures the return banks get on their
assets, i.e. how efficiently a bank’s management generates revenue from the bank’s assets. A higher ROA
means banks are making more profit, and a lower
ROA means banks are making less profit. Credit
quality is calculated by dividing the total provision
for bad loans and leases by total loans. It captures the
quality of banks’ credit as well as credit risk. A higher
credit quality means banks are making poorer quality,
riskier loans. Lastly, the capital-to-assets ratio is calculated by dividing total equity capital by total assets.
This ratio shows a bank’s capital as a share of total assets. More capitalized banks are considered safer and
less risky, and hence are more credit worthy.
I acquired all relevant data from multiple
sources. Each variable was collected at the state level
for each of the ten states included in the study. First,
I collected the data for the variables representing the
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overall banking industry in each state from the FDIC
website . Bank ROA is of annual frequency from
1966-2013. To calculate credit quality I downloaded
the provision for loan and lease losses and total loans.
They are annual frequency and range from 19672013. Calculating the capital-to-asset ratio required
downloading banks’ total equity capital and total assets. Again, they span from 1966-2013.
For regional economic indicators, I used the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for state
GDP. This data are also annual frequency ranging
from 1966-2013. Next, I downloaded unemployment
rates from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Again, the data are annual frequency, but range from
1976-2013. State HPI was found on the US Federal
Home Finance Agency (FHFA) website in annual
frequency for the years 1975-2013. After downloading these variables, I put them into real terms using
the national CPI (sourced from the BLS). I used 2009
as the base year and converted all values into 2009
CPI values. This will allow accurate comparison of
changes in the variables over time by accounting for
inflation. The bank prime loan rate is the interest rate
banks charge on loans to businesses. It was sourced
from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board website and was
adjusted for inflation to express it in real terms. A
summary of these variables, their description, and
source are summarized below in Table 1.
Figure 2 shows the total dollar amount loaned in C&I
loans for the years 1966-2013 for all ten states combined.
The greatest drop in the inflation-adjusted
C&I loans occurred during the financial crisis around
2008. As can be seen in the recession in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s, a recession brings about a
decrease of some magnitude in the level of C&I loans.
However, the magnitude of the decrease in C&I loans
during 2008 is much greater than the decrease in the
late1980s-early1990s recession, signaling the most recent crisis had a larger impact on C&I lending in the
Midwest. Figure 3 plots the overall ROA for all banks
in these 10 states. An ocular view shows the dramatic
decline in the overall health of banks in the ten-state
region during the financial crisis is easily noted by
the dramatic dip around 2008. This graph shows how
bank profits declined during the last financial crisis as
well as during the banking crisis of the late 1980s-ear-

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIII

ly 1990s. And, as with lending levels, the magnitude
of decrease in bank ROA in the recent crisis was far
greater than any other decrease in the series. Notably, in year 2009 banks in these 10 Midwestern states
had negative ROA, which means they suffered losses.
Table 2 shows the average values for all variables in
each state from 1966-2013.
Overall, each state in the Midwest region has
relatively similar values for the variables being analyzed. This shows each state was in a relatively similar
economic condition throughout the years 1966-2013.
Ohio has the greatest average C&I loans at $70.89
million, and Kansas has the lowest with $5.52 million. In regard to state GDP growth, Minnesota has
the highest growth rate (2.62%), and Michigan has
the lowest (1.092%). For overall bank heath, Illinois
banks have the lowest ROA ratio value (0.007) and
there is a three-way tie between Kansas, Kentucky,
and Ohio for the highest ROA ratio value (0.010).
5.2 Panel Unit Root Tests
The time-series statistical properties of the
variables were tested using panel unit root tests. Table 3
shows the results for the unit root tests. All variables are first expressed in logarithmic form in levels
and tested for panel unit roots. The null hypothesis of
both tests, Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003), is that the variable has a unit
root and is non-stationary. The rejection of the null
implies the variable is stationary in levels form. Based
on the two-panel unit root tests, log of real C&I
loans, log of housing price index, and log of credit
quality were first-differenced to ensure stationarity.
Next, the estimation model and corresponding results
are presented.
VI. Empirical Model
Regressions were run using two state-level indicators, real state GDP growth and real personal income
growth, separately. First, regressions were run using
real state GDP growth (Equation 1).
∆ln(C&I loans) = a0 + a1 (Real state-GDP growth)
+ a2ln(unemployment rates) +a3∆ln(state HPI) +
a4ln(ROA) +a5∆ln(CreditQuality) + a6ln(Capital-toAssets) + a7∆ln(real loan rate)
(Equation 1)

Four different model specifications on the aforementioned estimation equation were used. The first two
regressions had no fixed effects, with the latter including the lagged C&I loans as an explanatory variable (Equation 2) to examine if the lagged value has
any significant impact on the present period’s value.
∆ln(C&I loans) = a0 + a1 (Real state-GDP growth)
+ a2ln(unemployment rates) +a3∆ln(state HPI) +
a4ln(ROA) +a5∆ln(CreditQuality) + a6ln(Capital-toAssets) + a7∆ln(real loan rate) + a8∆ln(C&I loans)t-1
(Equation 2)
Next, regressions were run with fixed crosssectional and non-fixed period effects, i.e. no yearly
dummies. Fixed effects are used to account for any
heterogeneity across states or time that is not accounted for by the independent variables in the
regression equation. Lastly, a regression was run with
both cross-section and period fixed effects, i.e. with
state and time dummies. Real state GDP growth was
then replaced with real personal income growth and
the same four model specifications were used (Equation 3). Both state GDP growth and personal income
growth were used in order to explore the best proxy
for the business cycle. The results section discusses
which of these was a better proxy as indicated by the
regression results.
∆ln(C&I loans) = a0 + a1 (Real Personal Income
growth) + a2ln(unemployment rates) +a3∆ln(state
HPI) + a4ln(ROA) +a5∆ln(CreditQuality) +
a6ln(Capital-to-Assets) + a7∆ln(real loan rate) +
a8∆ln(C&I loans)t-1
(Equation 3)
The regression results are reported in the following
section.
VII. Results
The following tables, Tables 4 & 5, display the
regression results. The results from the regressions
with the real state GDP growth are shown in Table
4. The regression results without both state and time
dummies are labeled Model 1. Model 2 represents the
regression using neither state nor time dummies, but
including lagged C&I loans. Model 3 results represent
the regression with fixed state dummies only. Lastly,
Model 4 shows results from the regression without
the real loan rate and lagged C&I loans, but with both
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state and time dummies.
The various regression specifications provided
robust results in regard to the variables that impact
C&I loans. The significant variables were log of the
capital-to-assets ratio, log of bank ROA, state real
GDP growth, and the growth rate of the log of the
real loan rate. Model 2, which represents the regression where the lagged log of C&I loans growth rates
were included in the independent variables, shows
that this variable is significant. The results show that a
10% increase in a bank’s capital-to-assets ratio will
result in a decrease in real C&I loans of 1.2%-2.0%.
When a bank’s ROA increases 10%, real C&I loans
increase between 0.6%-0.7%. A 10% increase in state
GDP growth will result in an increase in real C&I
loans of 6.7%-7.0%. If the real loan rate increases
10%, real C&I loans will increase 7.4%-7.8%. And, a
10% increase in real C&I loans in the previous year
causes an increase in real C&I loans in the current
period by 0.9%. Interestingly, Model 4, which uses
both time and state dummies, reports that the real
state GDP growth is not significant. A plausible
explanation for this will come later. Thus, it can be
concluded that bank-specific variables and state GDP
growth have a significant impact on real C&I loan
growth.
Analyzing the statistical properties of the
four models, the F-statistics are all significant at the
99% confidence level. This means that the regression equations fit the data well. The R-squares are
low due to the use of first-differences, especially for
the dependent variable, real C&I loans. Between the
four models, their explanatory power ranges between
9%-25%. The Durbin-Watson statistic, (D-W stat),
ranges from 1.81-1.97 for all models. This is close to
the desired value of 2, and means the residuals are
not autocorrelated. As mentioned, the same regression specifications were used, but personal income
growth was inserted into the equation in the place of
real state GDP growth. These results are reported in
Table 5.
The results from the regressions with real
state personal income growth mirror those for real
state GDP growth. Model 1 represents the regression results without both state and time dummies.
Next, Model 2 shows results from the regression with
108

neither state nor time dummies, but with the lagged
value of real C&I loans. Model 3 results are from the
regression with state dummies but not time dummies. And, Model 4 shows the results from the regression without the loan rate and lagged C&I loans,
but including both state and time dummies.
As with the real state GDP growth results, the
significant variables are log of the capital-to-assets
ratio, log of bank ROA, state real personal income
growth, and the growth rate of the log of the real
loan rate. Model 2, which represents the regression
where the lagged log of the C&I growth rates were
included in the independent variables, shows that
this lagged variable is significant. Model 4 reports
that the state real personal income growth is not
significant. Though, overall it can be concluded that
bank-specific variables and state real personal income
growth most impact real C&I loans. According to
the results, when real state personal income is used
rather than real state GDP growth, a 10% increase in a
bank’s capital-to-assets ratio will result in a decrease in
real C&I loans of 1.1%-2.0%. When a bank’s ROA
increases 10%, real C&I loans increases between
0.5%-0.7%. A 10% increase in real personal income
growth will cause real C&I loans to increase between
11.00%-12.00%. If the real loan rate increases 10%,
real C&I loans will increase 8.5%-8.9%. Comparing
the coefficients of real state personal income growth
with that of real state GDP growth, I found state
personal income growth to have a larger coefficient.
This signifies that real C&I loans are more sensitive to
personal income growth than to state GDP growth.
The statistical properties for the regressions
with personal income growth were very similar to
the regressions that had state GDP growth that are
reported in Table 4. The F-statistics were all significant at the 99% confidence level meaning the regression equations fit the data well. The R-squares are low
again because of the use of first-differences. Between
the four models, their explanatory power ranges
between 10%-25%. The D-W stat ranges from 1.831.96 for all models signifying autocorrelation is not a
concern.
The similar results between the two state-level
economic indicators are not surprising. First, the negative coefficient for the capital-to-asset ratio implies
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banks with a higher capital to asset ratio lend less in
C&I loans. As mentioned in the introduction, C&I
loans are some of a bank’s riskiest categories of assets.
Therefore, as banks become more capitalized, they
will decrease their lending in C&I loans. The negative
coefficient also implies banks in the Midwest are riskaverse and invest in other, safer forms of assets rather
than C&I loans. The next significant variable is credit
quality. A rise in credit quality means a deterioration
of banks’ asset quality. When the quality of a bank’s
credit falls, banks increase their engagement in risky
lending practices. The other bank-specific variable
that is significant is ROA. This follows, because as
bank’s profits rise, banks fund more C&I loans.
The non-bank specific significant variable is
the real interest rate. As the interest rate that banks
charge on loans adjusted for inflation rises, banks are
incentivized to make more loans due to higher real
returns on loans. This is in accord with the loanable
funds theory. According to the theory, as the interest
rate rises, the supply of loanable funds rises.
The positive and significant effect of both real state
GDP growth and real personal income growth implies C&I lending in the Midwest is procyclical in nature. As the Midwest experiences an economic boom,
both real state GDP growth and real personal income
growth rise, which in turn raises C&I loans.
The other variables, state HPI and unemployment rate, were not significant. The state HPI may
not have proven significant in my research, as it is a
measure of residential house values. So, while a rise
or fall in the HPI may signal an economic expansion or recession, the direct impact of this will most
likely not be seen in real C&I loans, but rather in real
estate loans. The next insignificant variable is the state
unemployment rate. Changes in the unemployment
rates will most likely not have an effect on C&I loans.
Instead, because unemployment has a more direct
impact on individuals, unemployment rates will most
likely impact loans to individuals (such as auto loans)
made by banks .
Lastly, as noted, both real state GDP growth
and real personal income growth were insignificant in
the regression with both state and time fixed dummy
variables. This is because the number of state dummies, (10), are far less than the number of year dum-

mies. And, the large number of year dummies in the
sample of 368 observations affects the state real GDP
growth rates and makes them insignificant. Because
growth rates themselves are correlated with time, the
fixed time dummies make both of these variables
insignificant.
VIII. Conclusion
C&I loans are among the riskiest loans that
banks make. This is simply because one can never
be certain of how successful a business will be, and
thus, whether or not it will be able to pay off its
loan. This research aimed to examine the impacts
of regional economic cycles and the health of commercial banks on real C&I loans in the Midwest. To
study these relationships, regressions were run using
two state-level indicators: real state GDP growth
and real personal income growth. Several other state
economic and banking industry variables were used
as well. The significant variables identified in my
regressions were the same regardless of which statelevel indicator was used.
The results show that the main variables
which impact real C&I loans are bank profits, the
real loan rate, real state GDP growth, personal
income growth, and the capital-to-assets ratio. Real
C&I loans in the Midwest are increased by increasing bank profits (ROA). Likewise, an increase in the
lending rate, the state GDP growth rate or personal income growth rate, or a decrease in a bank’s
capital-to-asset ratio will also significantly increase
C&I loans. Moreover, I found real personal income
growth to have a greater impact on C&I loans than
state GDP growth. A 10% increase in real personal
income results in an 11%-12% increase in real C&I
loans, while a 10% increase in real state GDP growth
only causes a 6.70%-7.00% increase in real C&I
loans.
A policy that has had an impact on C&I
lending is the Dodd-Frank Act, which began in
2010. It has caused a general increase in banks’
capital-to-assets ratios since its enactment. The
Dodd-Frank Act inserted new requirements, which
demanded banks to spend more time and resources
ensuring they are following proper documentation and
reporting standards. This extra push for proper
banking also discourages banks from engaging in
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risky lending behaviors, like lending more C&I loans,
which occurred prior to the financial crisis. A decrease
in risky behavior leads banks to be more risk-averse,
and practice safer lending practices. So, the DoddFrank Act provides some explanation for the current
decrease in C&I loans. My research also provides
some explanations as to the banking industry’s situation during the recent financial crisis.
During the crisis, banks were flooded with
liquidity by the US Federal Reserve Board. This liquidity allowed banks to be more capitalized. As the results
show, the coefficient for capital-to-assets ratio is negative and significant. Therefore, the additional liquidity
caused a decrease in risky C&I loans. Banks in the
Midwest were operating over cautiously and ignoring
potential income earning investment opportunities by
making fewer C&I loans and investing in more capital.
In regard to the overall banking sector, the results show
that for commercial banks in the Midwest, it is
imperative that banks’ profits rise for them to give out
more C&I loans to businesses. Moreover, the positive
coefficient for real state GDP growth and real personal
income growth imply real C&I loans are procyclical to
regional economic activity.
Overall, my research proved quite conclusive
as to what regional economic indicators and bankspecific variables have an impact on real C&I loans.
Some areas of future research are to expand this study
to include all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The focus of this research was on 10 states in the
Midwest region, but adding in the remaining 40 states
would allow one to draw more conclusive results in
regard to the United States’ entire banking industry. A
second avenue for future research is to include other
types of loans that commercial banks make aside
from C&I loans. The other types of loans banks make
are agricultural loans, loans to individuals, and real
estate loans. Including all loan types will enable one
to provide a comparative prospective by comparing
the sensitivity of each category of loans to state GDP
growth and personal income growth. Adding loans to
individuals would most likely cause the state unemployment rate to be significant, because the amount
of loans made to individuals is heavily dependent on
one’s income and employment. Likewise, state HPI is
likely to have a significant impact on real estate loans.
A third variable to control for in future research is
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whether or not a bank is a single-market or multimarket bank. As mentioned in Section II, scholars
suggest these banks will react differently to changes
in regional economic conditions. Distinguishing
between the two and comparing the results is another way to examine the banking sector in another
way. These courses of future research will allow one
to draw more complete results that more wholly
represent commercial bank lending throughout the
United States.
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Table 2: Average Values for Variables by State
State

Real C&I
Loans

ROA

Credit
Quality

Capital-toAssets

State HPI

Unemployment
Rate
7.087

State Real
GDP
Growth
1.620

State Real
Personal
Income
1.734

Illinois

65,941,985.39

0.007

0.007

0.076

208.466

Indiana

10,565,238.14

0.009

0.005

0.082

170.818

6.234

1.846

1.905

Iowa

5,794,521.93

0.009

0.005

0.087

159.529

4.808

1.956

1.913

Kansas

5,521,575.34

0.010

0.007

0.089

155.470

4.805

2.242

2.235

Kentucky

6,420,949.59

0.010

0.005

0.084

184.569

6.997

2.065

2.466

Michigan

26,388,993.76

0.008

0.006

0.078

185.825

8.313

1.092

1.491

Minnesota

14,906,118.64

0.009

0.006

0.077

198.069

5.034

2.623

2.673

Missouri

12,762,458.50

0.009

0.006

0.081

182.374

6.016

1.886

2.014

Ohio

70,899,037.52

0.010

0.008

0.078

174.852

6.903

1.464

1.589

Wisconsin

12,781,725.50

0.008

0.005

0.081

189.967

5.603

2.040

2.220
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Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests
Levels
1st differenced
Levin, Lin &
Im, Pesaran and
Levin, Lin &
Im, Pesaran and
Variable
Chu t‐stat
Shin W‐stat
Chu t
Shin W‐stat
Log of real C& I Loans
‐0.222
0.979
‐8.003***
‐9.852***
Log of Return on Assets (ROA)
‐1.284*
‐2.336***
‐7.137***
‐9.918***
Log of Housing Price Index (HPI)
‐1.426*
‐0.894
‐2.534***
‐4.356***
Log of Unemployment Rate
‐1.533*
‐1.301*
‐8.144***
‐6.401***
Log of Credit Quality
0.360
‐2.869***
‐6.778***
‐5.448***
Log of Capital‐to‐Assets Ratio
‐3.153***
‐1.507*
‐13.369***
‐14.023***
State real GDP Growth
‐11.219***
‐10.128***
‐11.673***
‐19.770***
Log of real Loan Rate
2.823
0.277
3.686
11.888***
State real Personal Income Growth
‐1.650**
‐2.302**
‐13.852***
‐11.440***
* Denote rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root process. *** = at the 1% level, ** = at the 5% level, and * = at the
10% level.

Table 4: Results for GDP Growth
Model 1
c

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.03
(-0.24)
0.02
(1.27)

-0.01
(-0.10)
0.02
(1.11)

-0.04
(-0.26)
0.02
(1.27)

0.07***
(2.80)

log(Capital-to-Assets)

-0.13*
(-2.44)

-0.12**
(-2.15)

-0.12**
(-2.14)

-0.20*
(-1.92)

log(Return on Assets)

0.06***
(2.96)

0.06***
(2.91)

0.06***
(2.40)

State real GDP growth

0.67***
(2.86)
0.00
(0.04)
0.00
(0.01)

0.68***
(2.87)
0.01
(0.24)
0.01
(0.04)

0.70***
(2.93)
-0.01
(-0.19)
0.05
(0.21)

0.07**
(2.37)
-0.10
(-0.20)
-0.03
(-0.36)
-0.11
(-0.36)

0.74*
(1.66)

0.77*
(1.73)

0.78*
(1.74)

No
No

0.09*
(1.62)
No
No

Yes
No

∆log(Credit quality)

log (Unemployment rates)
∆log(HPI)
∆log(real loan rate)
∆log(real C&I loans)t-1
State dummies
Year dummies

-0.11
(-0.36)

Yes
Yes

N
368
368
368
368
2
R
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.25
F-Stat
5.13***
4.84***
2.72***
1.99***
D-W stat
1.81
1.97
1.86
1.94
* Denote rejecting the null hypothesis of insignificance. *** = at the 1% level, ** = at the 5% level, and * = at the
10% level. Terms in brackets denote the t‐stats.
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Table 5: Results for Real Personal Income
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-0.04
(-0.32)
0.02
(0.96)

-0.02
(-0.18)
0.01
(0.80)

-0.05
(-0.33)
0.02
(0.98)

0.07***
(2.83)

log(Capital-to-Assets)

-0.12**
(-2.30)

-0.11**
(-2.05)

-0.11**
(-1.98)

-0.20*
(-1.88)

log(Return on Assets)

0.06***
(2.89)

0.06***
(2.84)

0.05**
(2.34)

0.07**
(2.33)

1.13***
(3.40)
0.01
(0.28)
0.01
(0.06)

1.10***
(3.31)
0.01
(0.43)
0.02
(0.10)

1.21***
(3.61)
0.00
(0.08)
0.06
(0.27)

0.04
(0.06)
-0.02
(-0.32)
-0.12
(-0.40)

0.85*
(1.91)

0.88**
(1.97)
0.07
(1.39)
No
No

0.89**
(2.00)

c
∆log(Credit quality)

State real Personal Income
growth
log (Unemployment rates)
∆log(HPI)
∆log(real loan rate)
∆log(real C&I loans)t-1
State dummies
Year dummies

No
No

Yes
No

Model 4
-0.11
(-0.37)

Yes
Yes

N
368
368
368
368
2
R
0.10
0.10
0.12
0.25
F-stat
5.66***
5.20***
3.02***
1.99***
D-W stat
1.83
1.96
1.88
1.95
* Denote rejecting the null hypothesis of insignificance. *** = at the 1% level, ** = at the 5% level, and * = at the
10% level. Terms in brackets denote the t‐stats.
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